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Summary
The purpose of this article is to reflect on the advances made in the direction of a
welfare state in South Africa, and the possibility of its establishment. In order to
reflect on the question whether South Africa’s political economy is moving towards
a welfare state, certain arguments are advanced. First, a brief comment on South
Africa’s political economy is offered. Secondly, some key theories and actors that
could influence the South African political economy’s movement towards a welfare
state are identified. Thirdly, the author reflects on the question of whether such a
movement is taking place as well as the likelihood of a welfare state’s developing in
South Africa.
Die politiek van maatskaplike beskerming in Suid-Afrika:
besinning oor die totstandkoming van ’n welsynstaat
Die doel van hierdie artikel is om te besin oor die vordering wat gemaak word met
sowel as die moontlikheid om ’n welsynstaat in Suid-Afrika te bewerkstellig. Ten
einde oor  die vraagstuk te besin of Suid-Afrika se politieke ekonomie in die rigting
van ’n welsynstaat vorder, word die volgende argumente aangevoer. Ten eerste lewer
die skrywer kortliks kommentaar oor Suid-Afrika se politieke ekonomie. Tweedens
word ’n aantal teorieë en akteurs geïdentifiseer wat Suid-Afrika se ontwikkeling tot
’n welsynstaat kan beïnvloed. Derdens word besin oor die vraag of ’n beweging na
’n welsynstaat inderdaad plaasvind, sowel as oor die moontlikheid of ’n welsynstaat
in Suid-Afrika gevestig kan word.
Prof A J Venter, Dept of Political Science, Rand Afrikaans University, P O Box
524, Auckland Park 2006; E-mail: ajv@lw.rau.ac.za
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The purpose of this article is to reflect on the advances made inthe direction of a welfare state in South Africa and the possibi-lity of its establishment. The emphasis is on reflection, con-
templation and debate. It is not merely an empirical checklist —
whether there is a list of indicators of a welfare state and whether
South Africa meets or does not meet the criteria. It is time that South
African intellectuals started this debate, instead of merely swallowing
hook, line and sinker the liberal orthodoxy that the welfare state is on
its way out and that the minimal state is “in”. This article is an effort
to stimulate debate on the matter and is therefore in the final analysis
not specifically prescriptive on the question of whether the South
African economy should be managed towards a welfare state of some
kind. Rather it reflects on the question of whether social forces and
structural circumstances will usher in a welfare state in the course of
the development of the South African political economy.
In contemplating this problem, let me first summarise what is
meant by the term “welfare state”. The underlying normative commit-
ment of a welfare state is to improve the quality of life of the popula-
tion by promoting economic (or material) equality through the redis-
tributive power of the democratic state. Unregulated, freewheeling
economic competition is condemned as unacceptable, since it encou-
rages greed, avarice and social conflict. Free, unfettered competition is
seen as inefficient and unproductive. However, the modern welfare
state does not dispense with the advantages of the free market alto-
gether. Indeed it tries to establish a symbiotic relationship with the
free market, using it to produce the economic surpluses needed to fund
the welfare state. Exactly how this is accomplished differs from state to
state and from epoch to epoch within the ideology of state welfarism.
Immediately after the Second World War in Britain, for instance, the
state tried to manage wealth-creating enterprises by nationalising pri-
vate industry. This failed and Thatcher’s Conservative Party privatised
many of these state enterprises. In France, the state is still much invol-
ved in managing and owning production capacity. The general tenden-
cy in the twenty-first century welfare state is, however, to leave busi-
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ness to business and let the state redistribute resources by using its
political power to intervene in the economy.1
The virtue of the welfare state, in this defence, is that it removes
the distribution of wealth from the vagaries of the market in order to
ensure that all citizens have a stake in society and that each indivi-
dual has an incentive to contribute to the common weal. This con-
ception of the welfare state subscribes to the principles of formal
equality before the law and equality of opportunity for every citizen
or member of society. Moreover, in the welfare state some measure of
equality of outcome is encouraged, which means that the state inter-
venes in the economy through its monopoly on political power in
order to ensure and, if necessary, enforce an equitable distribution of
income, wealth and other social goods. The apologists for the welfare
state defend the redistribution of wealth on the grounds that it pro-
motes justice and social community (solidarity).2
1. The social consensus that underpins a welfare state
The modern welfare state as it exists in much of Western Europe is
based on a social consensus that has developed over the last century
or so. In my view the social consensus on the idea of the welfare state
comprises the following elements. In the first place social welfare
transfer payments (often called “welfare entitlements”) are seen as a
social right of citizenship, a form of civil contract between the vari-
1 This description has been gleaned from the vast literature on the welfare state. For
a good overview see Erikson 1993 and De Jasay 1985, chpt 4, as well as  Esping-
Anderson 1996; Scarborough 2000; Marsland 1996 & 2001; Palme 2001.
2 A reviewer of this article requested some evidence regarding what is termed the
“roll back” of the welfare state in Europe. This is a popular stereotype of neo-
liberally orientated financial journalists. A proper analysis of the welfare state in
Europe demonstrates that it is alive and well, going through normal adjust-
ments. But the salient and underlying assumptions of the welfare state in Eu-
rope are intact. In fact it would be political suicide for any party in Western
Europe to “significantly roll back” the welfare state. See for instance Scarborough
2000; Abrahamson 2001; Peterson 2001 as well as Marsland 1996 & 2001 for
persuasive arguments and statistics regarding this question. Marsland is a vehe-
ment critic of the welfare state and finds much evidence, to his disapprobation,
that the welfare state is alive and well in Western Europe and Britain.
ous social classes in society. Secondly, the welfare state’s mode of be-
ing requires that the contributors of resources show generosity to-
wards their less fortunate fellow citizens. By the same token, the less
fortunate should show modesty and restraint in collecting benefits,
since both groups acknowledge the reversibility of roles over time
(Petersen 2001: 3).
Furthermore, the individual is conceptualised as a victim of exter-
nal circumstances beyond his/her control: war, famine, redundancy,
disease, inflation, economic recession, foreign economic competition
and similar incidents and conditions leading to human insecurity.
The welfare state tries to compensate for most of the disadvantages
and inconveniences inflicted on the individual by life. In other
words, the welfare state acts as insurance against the insecurities and
neuroses of life. The European welfare state ideal typically assumes
that people live their entire life in the country of their birth and that
their mutual solidarity is nationally delimited.3 People managing
well will be willing to finance welfare benefits, since they may them-
selves one day find themselves under similar social stress: old age, un-
employment, disease, or disability (Peterson 2001: 2).
Some welfare states such as Germany (the Bismarckean model)
and Britain (the Beveridgean model)4 rely on the principle that social
insurance and benefits are related to previous employment and con-
tributions. In essence this is a reciprocity system and presupposes a
quid pro quo relation. The Scandinavian model relies heavily on tax
transfer mechanisms and is in essence an idea of role reversibility.
Role reversibility means that one imagines what help one would ap-
preciate in the other’s place. Almost Biblically, it relies on the idea
that one is one’s fellow’s keeper (Petersen 2001: 4).
The social consensus on which the (West) European welfare state
has been constructed claims the following successes:
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3 In real-life situations in Europe, this assumption can no longer be defended,
since immigration into the European economies is needed to augment an aging
workforce. Cf Peterson 2001: 3.
4 See Marsland 1996 for a discussion of the Bismarckean and Beveridgean models
of social security.
• reduction and alleviation of poverty
• weakening of social exclusion and polarisation
• developing equitable income distribution
• smoothing the income stream in an individual’s life
• providing individual security
• weakening social tensions, and
• increasing the supply of social services not provided by either the
market or charity (Peterson 2001: 6; Kuhnle 2000: 234).
These are significant benefits and many societies in the third
world are striving towards something similar. The emigration of
people from the so-called third world into the European welfare states
is partly explained by the generous benefits that these states supply.
2. South Africa on its way to a welfare state?
I shall reflect on the question of whether South Africa’s political eco-
nomy is being managed in the direction of a welfare state under three
headings. First, a brief comment on its political economy will be of-
fered. Secondly, some key theories and actors that could influence the
South African political economy’s move towards a welfare state will
be identified. Thirdly, the question of whether such a movement is
taking place, as well as the likelihood of a welfare state’s developing
in South Africa over time, will be addressed.
3. Observations on South Africa’s political economy
South Africa’s current economic problems — mainly deep inequalities
in income, poverty and a lack of international competitiveness — go
back to the mid-nineteenth century. The discovery of gold and dia-
monds on the highveld of South Africa spearheaded its transformation
from a backward agrarian economy to a mining and industrial econo-
my by the middle of the twentieth century. The country’s industrial
development was initially focused on mining with little job creation
elsewhere.5 The manpower needs of the mines caused economic deve-
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5 For an analysis of South Africa’s early history of industrialisation, see Lipton
1987.
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lopment in the rural areas to stagnate. The mining-industrial economy
came to be dominated by a few huge mining-financial conglomerates,
with an in-built oligopolism. With the absence of real competition as
well as the elimination of African peasants, little other economic
development took place in African rural areas.
The political economy of apartheid led to a huge racially based
wage gap. The industrial base was built behind tariff walls and im-
port substitution. Due to its international political and economic iso-
lation, South Africa was forced to maintain a macro-economic policy
of import substitution during the seventies and the eighties when La-
tin America and South-East Asia started on the road to export-based
industrialisation. Moreover, the ideological costs of apartheid, such as
resettling workers far from the industrial cities and the policy of
state-aided industrial decentralisation, which made no economic
sense, led to an inefficient economy (cf RSA, Dept of Social Services
1999: 21; Lipton 1987: 227-30).
The political economy has created deep inequalities in terms of
the distribution of wealth. These were perpetuated into participation
in the economy: whites had open access to economic opportunities;
blacks were restricted. Numerous laws, rules, regulations and prac-
tices benefited the white population. Businesses and industries were
established in mainly “white” areas; job reservation was legislated by
statute by the various National Party governments, starting with the
Hertzog government in 1924 and ending, in reality, with the De
Klerk government in 1994 (Cf Lipton 1987: 14-21; McCarthy 1990:
53; Schoeman 2001: 324).
These practices, linked to South Africa’s international economic
position, resulted in a duality in its economy:
• On the one hand the country developed a political economy in
which the distribution of wealth was (and largely still is) skewed
in favour of the white minority. This means that the economy is
divided along racial lines with its wealth primarily benefiting the
white population. The richest 10% of the country’s population
earns 50% of the national income; the poorest 20% only 1.5%.
85% of the poor are black. The country’s Gini coefficient is calcu-
lated at 0.68, which reflects this inequality (Schoeman 2001: 326).
• The second duality within the economy is one typical of a develo-
ping country: the rural/urban divide. Economic activities are lar-
gely restricted to urban areas, with areas or “islands” of economic
development concentrated in the Gauteng province, the Durban-
Pietermaritzburg area of KwaZulu Natal, the Port Elizabeth-
Uitenhage area of the Eastern Cape and the Cape Town-Bellville
complex in the Western Cape. This means that poverty and depri-
vation are rife in rural areas and that urbanisation, as in many other
parts of Africa, grows at a rate which makes it difficult to plan ur-
ban development properly (Schoeman 2001: 325).
South Africa has a high unemployment rate. Formal unemploy-
ment/underemployment ranges between 26% and 35% (as at Septem-
ber 2001).6 Of the formally unemployed, approximately 50% are enga-
ged in the informal sector. These are quite often marginal economic
activities, like hawking, which do not necessarily eliminate material po-
verty. Some commentators claim that South Africa’s unemployment
ratio is the highest recorded for a middle-income economy (Nattrass
1998: 4; SA Reserve Bank 2001 Annual Economic Report: 12).
Moreover the dependency ratio — the proportion of the youth
(under age 15) to economically active adults (ages 15 to 64) — places
a heavy burden on the economy. Half the population is under 24,
with those under four comprising the largest age group. High unem-
ployment, together with a high youth dependency ratio, creates a low
revenue base for government. Consequently government has smaller
material resources at its disposal to create or encourage the creation
of employment and to provide social security nets for the poor. Taxa-
tion levels are disproportionally high in South Africa, creating an
onerous tithe on the wealthier, but relatively small middle class in
the country. High taxation, low labour productivity and government
dissaving through deficit financing of its budget result in low
domestic savings and investment and therefore low capital accumu-
lation. This makes South Africa highly dependent on foreign invest-
ment and loans for economic development. It increases the country’s
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6 The figures differ according to which method of calculation is used. The Labour
Force Survey calculated unemployment as 35.9% in September 2001, while the
Survey of Employment and Earning calculated it to be 25.8%. Cf SA Reserve Bank
2001 Annual Economic Report: 12.
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vulnerability to international capital flows and financial crises
(Schoeman 2001: 325, 326).
The major failure of economic policy after the establishment of
the Union of South Africa in 1910 was that the fairly rapid economic
growth of the first seventy years of the Union’s history was never
transformed into an economic development embracing the majority
of the population. Economic development means that the whole po-
pulation, or at least majority of the population experiences sustained
improvement in its standard of living. Economic growth merely
points to an increase in average wealth but does not mean that its dis-
tribution benefits the population as a whole. South Africa expe-
rienced economic growth, but not economic development — the
majority of its population remained poor, while the distribution of
new wealth was limited to the white population. Furthermore, as was
the case with most African economies in this era, growth was highly
dependent on earnings from the export of minerals and other com-
modities (Schoeman 2001: 327).
These developments — and, of course, in a different sense, this
lack of development — have left the South African political economy,
in the year 2001 with, among others, the following features:
• Ownership of land is still largely in the hands of a white minority
(eg 1.0% of the white community, mainly farmers, who comprise
0.125% of the total population, own 85% of agricultural land).
• There is an oligopolistic corporate business sector dominated by
ten large corporations.
• Whites in general still enjoy levels of health, education, social
services and general living standards far superior to those of the
majority of the black population.
• The growth of a black middle-class in the last five years was large-
ly facilitated by the change in the political power base. Employ-
ment creation occurred within the public sector rather than the
private sector. Class differences within the black community now
emulate those between black and white in South Africa. Political
transformation has led to the rapid economic empowerment of a
new black elite by the state. The instant enrichment of certain
black interests in the last seven years has been breathtaking.
• The country is increasingly subject to problems relating to region-
wide endemic poverty and deprivation, such as illegal immigra-
tion, crime, and the smuggling of drugs and small arms.
• The neglect of human development, particularly in the field of
formal education, makes for a shortage of skilled labour and of the
managerial skills necessary if the economy’s productivity and
competitiveness is to develop despite growing unemployment.
• Despite high levels of unemployment, the cost of labour in South
Africa is high and the productivity of all factors of production
(not only labour) is low. Hence international competitiveness is
curtailed (Schoeman 2001: 325, 326).
The following key economic indicators are pertinent to the above
analysis:7
• In the last decade the GDP has increased by an average of 2% per
annum, while public expenditure has increased by 3.5% per annum
in real terms. Even the “good years” of 1999 and 2000 produced
growth rates of only 2% and 3%, respectively, while 2.5% was ex-
pected for 2001(SA Reserve Bank 2001: 1, 2).
• Over the past five years gross domestic savings as a percentage of
GDP have declined from 19% to 16% of GDP.
• The deficit in the current account of the balance of payments has
been an average of $1.3 billion per year (3-4% of GDP, but decli-
ning) for the last five years. The low savings rate as well as the de-
ficit on the current account clearly makes South Africa reliant on
uncertain foreign capital flows.
• Employment has been declining at 1.6% per annum for the last de-
cade.
• Inflation has declined from a rate of 13.6% in 1989-1993 to
7.5% in 1994-2001, but this is still almost three times higher
than that of the country’s major trading partners. This leads to a
steady depreciation in the rand.
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7 This information has been gleaned from the CDE Report (1999) as well as
checked against the latest (September 2001) Annual Report of the SA Reserve
Bank. Where necessary specific page numbers and/or references have been indi-
cated. The full report is available on the website <www.resbank.co.za/
economics/annual2001/domes.html>
• The average budget deficit of the state increased from 4.3% in
1989-1993 to 5.7% over the next five years. However, this has
now been brought down to less than 2.5% in the 2000/2001 fis-
cal year.
• High domestic consumption, high increases in salaries and wages
and a continuing state budget deficit have led to the imposition
of restrictive monetary policies by the SA Reserve Bank. The
prime overdraft rate for the last decade averaged 19%, but decli-
ning steeply in the period September 1999 to September 2001,
when it was only 13% (SA Reserve Bank Quarterly Report, Sep-
tember 2001: 2);
• However, much of the strict monetarist policy of the ANC go-
vernment over the last five years has strengthened the state’s
financial position and South Africa’s macro-economy is in much
better shape than seven years ago when the ANC came to power
(cf CDE Report 1999: 97, 98, 100, as well as SA Reserve Bank
2001 Annual Economic Report:1).
4. The macro-economic policy of the ANC government
When the present ANC-led government took power in 1994, the
South African economy had become stagnant and uncompetitive. It
needed to be completely overhauled and made more racially equitable
and inclusive, but also more internationally competitive. Basic social
services had to be extended to African people; human capital deve-
lopment fostered; subsidies to commercial farmers, mines and indus-
try had to be scrapped, and at the same time state expenditure had to
be reduced in real terms. Inflation also had to be reduced. For political
reasons, the ANC government did not choose the South-East Asian
route of a low wage, full employment economy. Investment in human
capital and strengthening the skills of the work force to make it more
globally competitive, is the basis of the ANC-government’s economic
policy (RSA, Dept of Social Services 1999: 20).
The government’s current macro-economic policy is known by
the acronym GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution).
GEAR is a strategy aimed at rebuilding and restructuring the econo-
my. It creates a context to “successfully confront the related challen-
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ges of meeting basic needs, developing human resources, increasing
participation in the democratic institutions of civil society and im-
plementing the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Program-
me) in all its facets” (RSA, Dept of Finance 1996: 2).
GEAR’s aim is to “catapult” South Africa into a “new burst of
economic activity” with higher levels of growth, development and
employment and a “significantly improved distribution of income
and opportunities”. The higher growth path depends on attracting
foreign direct investment, encouraging higher domestic saving and
achieving a strong export performance. The strategy also involves
greater industrial competitiveness, a tighter fiscal stance, the mode-
ration of wage increases, accelerated public investment, efficient ser-
vice delivery and a major expansion of private investment (RSA,
Dept of Finance 1996: 3; RSA 1999: 288).
The state’s macro-economic policy can thus be described as neo-
liberal, but including some socialist components, such as the redis-
tribution of income and the construction of homes for the poor. The
policy is guided by the following key elements:
• creating a competitive, fast-growing economy
• redistributing income to the poor and disadvantaged
• achieving sustainable economic growth and job creation
• improving policing and streamlining the criminal justice system
• building homes for the poor and improving municipal infra-
structure and living conditions, as well as
• targeting poverty relief (cf RSA 1999: 307).
The national budget prioritises spending on education, health
and welfare. Policies have been put in place to fund productivity
skills training, but this is funded off-budget by a training levy on en-
terprises (SA Reserve Bank September 2001: 16). The 2001/2002
national estimates of expenditure reveal the servicing of public debt
to be a major weakness in the state’s budget. In 2001/2002 it consu-
med R48 billion, ie 18.6% of the total budget, or 5.5% of the GDP.8
8 Progress has been made in bringing down the relative size of the public debt;
however, it still consumes significant resources which could have been used
elsewhere.
If this figure is compared with the expenditure for education in the
same budget, which is R58 billion, the type of restriction placed on
social spending by servicing the public debt is clear. The public debt
ratio as a proportion of GDP is not inordinately high at 55% of GDP.
Moreover, the state is dissaving at present, and has been doing so for
the last decade. The 2001/2002 budget deficit is 2.5% of GDP,
down from 9% in 1994, while the consolidated national expenditure
(the state budget) consumes 27.1% of GDP. Therefore the public
debt as a percentage of GDP has been declining during the last five
years and is a considerable improvement on its predecessor (Manuel
2001: 7, 8).
Likewise, the state’s dissaving has been improving steadily. In
2001 it was 0.25% of GDP, compared to 4.4% in 1994. The target
is to eliminate state dissaving in the medium-term. However, the cu-
mulative effect of state dissaving in the last decade has been conti-
nued high interest rates in the country. At the time of writing, the
prime overdraft rate was 13%, inflation was 6.5%, yielding a high
real interest rate of 7.5% (SA Reserve Bank September 2001, Manuel
2001: 8).
4.1 Spending on social welfare
The state’s budget is quite strongly restricted in terms of what can be
done to improve the standard of living of the poorer members of
South African society. Moreover, 58% of the 2001 national budget
was spent on social services — education, health, and welfare. The lar-
gest single redistributive programme of the government is the system
of social grants to the elderly, disability and child support grants,
which provide support to 3 million South Africans (7.5% of the po-
pulation every month). However, the income tax burden is shared by
a relatively small section of the population. Only about 12% of South
Africa’s economically active population pays income tax. The wealth-
iest members of society are taxed at a marginal rate of 42% on an
income of R200 000 per annum, which is high by industrialised world
standards (CDE 1999: 90; Manuel 2001: 19, Gouws 2001: 3).9
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(CDE 1999: 90.) See also the Budget speech of the Minister of Finance (Manuel
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2001: 21), in which he indicated that the SARS had considerably improved its
tax collection capacity.
10 Source: Dept of Finance, Budget Review, 2000 <www:SARS.gov.za/budget_
2000/review:6>.
Expenditure R 1 2 3 4 5
1993 1730 1280 1464 1790 1673
1997 2320 1977 1743 1334 1924
Increase per cap
34.1% 54.4% 28.0 -2.6% -20.2%
in each quintile
The six-year trend shows that social expenditure has been redistribu-
ted from the wealthiest 20% to the poorest 40% of the population.
The same trend is demonstrated in the percentage share of the ex-
penditure of the five quintiles.
Table 1b: Percentage share of expenditure
However, within the limitations pointed out above, the ANC
government has clearly embarked on a redistributive social spending
policy. It is redistributing resources from rich to poor and from white
to black. The following tables10 indicate how the ANC government
has changed social spending priorities between 1993 and 1997, the
social spending gap between rich and poor, and the gap between
white and black (cf Manuel 2001: 3).
Table 1a: Increases in social expenditure per capita: 1993/1997. The
figures are per quintile, 1=poorest 20% of population, 5=richest 20% of
population.
Quintiles 1 2 3 4 5
Share % 1993 27.4% 21.9% 20.5% 17.6% 12.7%
Share % 1997 30.7% 25.8% 20.1% 14.7% 8.7%
The redistributive tendency is clear: the wealthiest 40% saw their
share in social expenditure decline from 30.3% of the total to 23.4%,
while the poorest 40% saw an increase in their share of social expen-
diture from 49.3% to 56.5%.
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Year Black Brown Indian White Total
1993 R1439 R2014 R2529 R1732 R1555
1997 R2012 R1812 R2000 R1435 R1924
Year Black Brown Indian White Total
1993 70.1% 11.2% 4.2% 14.5% 100%
1997 80.2% 8.2% 2.6% 9.07% 100%
Sources: RSA 1999: 308; RSA, Dept of Finance 2001: 22
There is a clear upward trend in the relative share of the budget be-
ing spent on social services. This is in line with the GEAR policy of
the ANC-led government, which sees redistributing wealth to the
poor and targeting poverty relief as among its priorities.
5. Some remarks on social policy in South Africa
Since the demise of apartheid and the establishment of a new political
order, a radical new paradigm has been introduced in the country’s
social policy. The intellectual framework of democratic socialism
drives the social policy of the ANC-led government, with an empha-
sis on equality and equity in human relations. The government has
enacted a number of new laws since 1994 in order to put its ideo-
logical views into practice. Among the most important are:
Fiscal year 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02
Amount R bil 88,6 98 103 129 155
% of Budget 46,6% 47,7% 47,2% 50% 58%
% of GDP 14,6% 15,1% 14,6% 15,3% 16,0%
The expenditure per capita on blacks increased substantially in the
six-year period, ie by 39.9%.
Table 1d: Percentage share in spending per racial group
The trend shows lucidly that white, brown and Indian people saw
their share of social expenditure decrease in the six-year period, while
blacks received a significant increase.
Table 2: Total government expenditure on welfare services: 
social services, health, education
Table 1c: Social spending per racial group per capita 1993/1997
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• the abolition of the death penalty
• laws on gender equality
• affirmative action employment laws
• legalisation of abortion on demand in the first fif-
teen weeks of pregnancy
• laws which protect the right of collective bargain-
ing in the workplace
• laws which prohibit unfair dismissal
• land reform, including restoration of land rights or
payment of reparation to people of colour unfairly
deprived of their land after 1913
• the use of the national budget as a redistributive
mechanism to benefit the poorer (mostly black) sec-
tor of society
• laws to improve the lot of women in traditional
African communities in terms of property and inhe-
ritance rights, and
• laws protecting the right of individuals to choose
their own sexual orientation and to protect such
persons against discrimination based on their sexual
orientation (RSA 1999: 405, 406).
The government’s social welfare policy makes provision for:
• the promotion of self-reliance to empower people to
play a meaningful role in society
• the use of auxiliary workers, volunteers, and family-
based and community-based models of care, rather
than institutionalised care
• state grants to the elderly, indigent children and the
disabled
• restorative justice in dealing with children and fa-
milies in trouble with the law
• a law against domestic violence to strengthen fami-
lies and to make domestic violence a statutory rather
than a common law offence
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• the right of biological fathers to participate in deci-
ding whether children born out of wedlock may be
given up for adoption
• the appointment of family advocates (lawyers) and
councillors at state expense to submit recommenda-
tions to court regarding the well-being of children
in divorce cases, and
• a project to aid children and youths who run foul of
the law, on the principle that children are best cared
for by their families (RSA 1999: 406).
Taking this outline of the ANC government’s economic and social
policies into consideration, one can address the question of the move
toward a welfare state in South Africa.
6. What builds a welfare state, and is South Africa 
on its way to a welfare state?
A number of theories have been advanced to explain the development
of the welfare state. Several well-known ones are briefly summarised
below and applied to present-day South Africa.
6.1 The industrialism thesis
This theory builds on the fact that the industrialisation of a political
economy leads to migration of workers towards cities, where they are
exposed to the vagaries of free-market competition (Scarborough
2000: 228, 229). The main socio-economic problem is that market-
based industrial economies are not able to solve the phenomenon of
economic cycles. Consequently the working class is subject to re-
trenchment and ill-equipped to face the risks of the market place.
Therefore in industrialising societies that are also democratising,
pressure builds up for state intervention in the economy to supply
some security for the industrial working class by means of social in-
surance, socialised health and welfare services, and free or nearly free
education. Moreover, the welfare state becomes possible in an indus-
trialised economy because sufficient wealth is created to be redis-
tributed to the working class and ensure its material security.
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In present-day South Africa, much of this theory applies. The coun-
try has been industrialising since the late nineteenth century. Since the
mid-1970s African-led labour unions have been lobbying governments
vehemently for job security, minimum wages, pensions, social security
payments and the right to strike. Retrenchments since 1994, with the
restructuring of the economy, have led to the shedding of 500 000
jobs. This has increased pressure by organised labour on the democratic
ANC government for more regulated job security as well as state
intervention to ensure economic benefits for workers (cf CDE 1999:
57, 85; SA Reserve Bank September 2001: 12-6).
6.2 The “contradictions of capitalism” thesis
According to neo-Marxist theories, welfare states originate in the
contradictions of capitalism. Capitalist political economies need to
ensure conditions favourable to capital accumulation. Capital needs
the state to ensure social peace, and labour needs the state to limit
the predations of capital. The state presides over a social contract: it
accedes to the demands of labour by establishing social welfare poli-
cies funded by economic surpluses generated by the capitalist econo-
my. It keeps the loyalty of capital and ensures a favourable invest-
ment climate by keeping the demands of labour in check and en-
suring reasonable tax limits on capitalist enterprises (cf Offe 1984).
To placate “capital”,11 the present South African government sub-
scribes to the so-called Washington consensus on economic policy.12 It
is derived from the theories and practices of neo-liberal economics and
the general policy prescriptions of the Bretton Woods Institutions,
which are situated in Washington. This doctrine holds that the private
sector is the primary engine of economic growth. Governments should
keep inflation low by applying strict monetarist policies, maintain
price stability and shrink state bureaucracy. The state should maintain
a balanced or near-balanced budget, keep taxes low, maintain low
tariffs on imported goods and promote exports. Moreover, states should
remove restrictions on foreign investment, privatise state-owned enter-
11 This term is used here within the context of the “contradictions of capitalism”
thesis as summarised.
12 The GEAR Policy of 1996.
prises and utilities, deregulate capital markets, promote a convertible
currency and allow free repatriation of capital, interest and dividends
to foreign investors. Industries as well as the stock and bond markets
should be opened to foreign competition. Lastly, states should strive
towards “good governance”, eliminate government subsidies and kick-
backs to the private sector, and manage state services through public-
private partnerships (cf Friedman 1999: 121-8).
As pointed out above, the South African government is quite
strongly sympathetic to labour demands for security against the va-
garies of the (global) marketplace. For instance the Basic Conditions
of Employment Act grants workers maternity and paternity leave, li-
mits hours to 45 a week, gives preference to the regulation of work-
place agreements via collective bargaining at the industry level and
prohibits child labour. It also protects workers against arbitrary hi-
ring and firing and, in a wide range of industries, minimum wage
levels are prescribed. The Employment Equity Act forces employers
to implement affirmative action plans which are monitored by the
Department of Labour (SA Reserve Bank September 2001: 16). En-
trepreneurs regularly complain that the labour system in South Afri-
ca is unnecessarily rigid and makes businesses uncompetitive against
low-wage Asian economies, while labour still complains about being
insufficiently protected against the vagaries of Asian and other low-
wage economic competition (cf CDE 1999: 84, 85; RSA 1999: 295,
296).
Since 1994 the government has succeeded in managing the con-
tradictions of capitalism reasonably successfully, but at a price. Mi-
nisters have been heckled at the annual congresses of labour unions
and many investors are wary of investing in an economy which has
“inflexible labour laws”.13 These contradictions regularly require the
government defending capitalism to labour unions and labour rights
to capitalists (cf CDE 1999: 85-97).
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13 The acrimonious exchanges between Minister Fraser-Moleketi and the Public
Service Unions in early October 2001 are illustrative of this tension, Finansies
& Tegniek 4 October 2001: 4.
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6.3 The “nation-state building” thesis
This theory supposes that welfare states arise as a result of the strate-
gies whereby capitalist elites integrate workers into the capitalist po-
litical economy of the national state. In order to do this the state
offers social protection as a rational-legal and impersonal form of
state action. Social protection becomes a matter of the rights of the
citizen against the state. These rights are acquired through demo-
cratic processes and are justiciable. The elites legitimate the political
power of the state by incorporating the working classes through the
mechanisms of social security (cf Friedman 1981; Esping-Anderson
1994; Alber 1988).
The South African government is committed to a programme of
“nation building”, although this is primarily a political ideology di-
rected against ethnic and racial fragmentation. The government does
not have the economic resources to implement a typical West-Euro-
pean welfare state. However, its state spending priorities in
successive budgets have been redistributive in nature, favouring the
poorer sectors of the population and taxing the wealthier sectors, as
in Tables 1 and 2 above. To operationalise the transfer of resources,
taxes on the wealthy are often imposed by direct user fees such as toll
roads, school fees,14 stamp duties, transfer duty on fixed property,
inheritance tax, tax on pension funds, and the like. The poor and
working classes benefit from this redistribution in rational and legal
ways, such as the right to an old-age grant, a children’s grant, free
medical treatment for pregnant women and children under six years
of age at state hospitals, free and compulsory education, housing
subsidies for the working class and a limited supply of free water and
electricity to the poor. In this way the legitimacy of the ruling party,
the state and its ruling power elite is accomplished. In other words,
14 School fees and toll roads, it goes without saying, represent a regressive tax on
the poorer sectors of the community. A government school in South Africa may
not exclude a child on the grounds of its parents’ ability to pay the school fees.
This is in keeping with section 29(1) of the South African constitution which
gives everyone the right to a basic education. It can also be argued that the re-
cently implemented tax on pension funds is regressive at least to the poorer
members of such a fund.
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a nation state is consolidated by the use of economic redistribution
and limited welfarist policies (cf also CDE 1999).
6.4 The “resources of power” thesis
This thesis holds that the growth of reformist (or “progressive”) trade
unions and the ascendancy of labour-based political parties to execu-
tive power are the main forces in devising and developing public po-
licies designed to bring about greater equality between classes in a
bourgeois capitalist state (cf Shalev 1983: 317; Esping-Anderson
1987). The social and political transformation of a capitalist society
rests on the balance of power achieved between classes (the capitalists
and the working classes). Where a strong labourist political party is
in power for a significant period of time, supported by a well-
organised and disciplined trade union movement, the state is likely
to embark upon social policies that are redistributive and welfarist in
orientation. The ideology of the ruling party in power is important
in determining the type of options and actions that will be taken to
shape a welfare state in such a society. Such parties will try to reduce
inequalities in society — which will affect the poor and the labour-
ing classes. These in turn form the basis of such a labour party and
will tend to help it in remaining in power. Transforming a capitalist
state to a welfare state is in essence a political process that intervenes
in the political economy of such a state to redress economic and social
inequities if not inequalities.
This is probably the strongest theory supporting the ultimate de-
velopment of a welfare state in South Africa. The ANC is a centrist
to left-of-centre, African nationalist-labour coalition and is support-
ed by a strong labour union movement. Indeed, the ANC, the South
African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade
Unions are in a formal governing alliance, the so-called Tripartite Al-
liance. In its own words the ANC is:
A broad multi-class, mass organisation, uniting the motive forces
on the basis of a programme for transformation. It must strive to
remain a broad democratic movement by accepting into its ranks all
those who accept and abide by its policies and objectives.
Among these forces are the organisations of the working class — the
South African Communist Party and the progressive trade union
movement, represented by COSATU, in particular. […] This Tri-
partite Alliance is therefore not a matter of sentiment, but an orga-
nisational expression of the common purpose and unity in action
that these forces share (ANC Policy Statement 1996).
However, at present a black capitalist elite is developing in the
ranks of the ANC. This elite has strong ideological bonds with the go-
verning party, and members often leave active politics to start very lu-
crative private capitalist ventures. Therefore the governing party faces
the “contradictions of capitalism” thesis mentioned in the first theory
explaining the welfare state, above. As has been shown in the brief
exposition of the ANC government’s social policies, these are quietly
redistributive. However, they favour not only the poorer working
classes of South Africa, but also the previously disadvantaged mem-
bers of the black elite, by means of explicit affirmative action pro-
grammes. Inasmuch as class differences develop within the ANC, the
contradictions of capitalism will also make themselves felt in the
ranks of the ruling party. If the “resources of power” thesis is correct,
and the economy becomes sufficiently industrialised and produces
significant surpluses, the ANC alliance may well make welfare state-
like compromises between (black) capitalists and black labour unions.
7. Comment and reflection
From the above highly condensed analysis it is clear that the ANC
government is determined to redress the imbalances of the past by
means of state intervention policies in the political economy. How-
ever, although some of its rhetoric is socialist, it is hampered by the
fact that the ANC does not only represent the workers of South Afri-
ca. An African nationalist elite controls the ANC, and unsurprisingly
its policies also favour this constituency. A strong movement towards
the embourgeoisement of Africans in South Africa is under way, under-
mining the idea of working class solidarity. The ANC has to manage
a precarious balance of power between the aspirations of the poor and
the working classes of South Africa and the economic desires of the
aspiring African/black elite as well as the capitalist business enter-
prises and their class. In fact, the black elite has done very well out
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of the state transformation of South Africa since 1994, while the
poorest sector of black society has been left behind.15
In the light of the evidence presented above, South Africa is clear-
ly not a typical welfare state — the economic resources to support a
fully-fledged welfare state are not available, and the global economic
power structures do not favour such an economy. A glance at the level
of welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP confirms the minima-
list welfare state in South Africa. During the last five years, the state
spent around 15% of GDP on its welfare budget: education, health
and social security.16 The typical Scandinavian welfare budget is
around 30% of GDP. Even fastidious Thatcherite Britain spent
around 27% of GDP on welfare (Abrahamson 2001: 2). Moreover, in
South Africa, strong class divisions reinforced by racial divisions at
present impede a national feeling or even a conception of social soli-
darity, essential to the promotion of a welfare state. The middle clas-
ses, mostly white, have very little welfare protection. Middle-class
South Africans have limited access to state-aided health care, unem-
ployment insurance and old-age pensions. The quality of state health
care is poor.17 Unemployment insurance and old-age social grants are
strictly means tested.18 Consequently many middle-class citizens do
not qualify for unemployment insurance or old-age grants. Social
15 The income of black people in the high-income group in South Africa has in-
creased from 13% of GDP in 1996 to 23.7% in 2001, which represents a very
significant increase over five years (Beeld 20 February 2001: 6).
16 Cf Table 2.
17 The private sector spends around R35 billion per annum on health services,
much of this financed by medical aid schemes (F & T May 2001: 23). The
funding of these medical aid schemes in terms of a welfare state is nothing but
a private tax to provide adequate health care to the wealthier sections of society.
In my opinion this type of private tax mitigates against the feeling of social
solidarity needed to maintain a welfare state.
18 Unemployment insurance is only available to those earning less than R93 000
per annum. Old-age social grants are low — R570-00 per month, and means
tested. Persons owning property and receiving an income were tested by a social
welfare officer in terms of Act 59 of 1992. From 1 December 2001 the property
clause has been eliminated. However, in terms of the Law “grants are not meant
for people who have enough money to care for themselves. Grants are meant for
those who are in most need.” <www.welfare.gov.za/socialgrants>.
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grants for the aged are non-contributory grants from the public
purse. The state-managed unemployment fund is a Bismarckean con-
tributory type of fund, and is not universally available to all employ-
ed people. Only lower middle-income earners qualify for member-
ship and the benefits are meagre. After six months, most benefits
expire. Yet, at the same time, the middle classes are fairly heavily tax-
ed to provide for the minimalist social grants made to the poorer sec-
tors of society. This class-based welfare discrimination does not en-
courage class-based social solidarity and is divisive.
The Scandinavian welfare state promotes social solidarity via the
idea that both contributing to welfare and drawing benefits, are uni-
versal. Therefore every working (or income-generating) individual
must contribute by way of social security tax in order for everyone to
share in the benefits of the welfare state. The type of social benefits
paid out by the South African state, as well as its distinct redistribu-
tive policies,19 do not comply with the welfare state principle of so-
cial solidarity. Taking from the rich and giving to the poor enhances
neither the idea of reciprocity of the Beveridgean or Bismarckean
welfare state nor the idea of role reversal inherent in the Scandinavian
conception of the welfare state. At best, state social welfare in South
Africa is aimed at poverty relief and minimalist social protection.
However, one should also consider the substantial influence of the
limited social redistribution that is taking place within the con-
straints of the current economic capacity. The Minister of Finance re-
ferred to this in his 2001 budget speech, and it bears repeating that
the largest single redistributive programme of the government is the
system of social grants for the elderly, the disabled and child support,
providing R31.6 billion support to 3 million South Africans (7.5%
of the population) every month. Moreover, the size of the education
budget (R58.5 billion) and the health budget (R29.6 billion) point
to considerable “social welfare spending” in South Africa.
19 A further complication in South Africa is that the state’s redistributive policies are
not simply class-based. Due to our apartheid history, the distribution of wealth in
South Africa is visibly race- or colour-based. Thus wealthy whites perceive redis-
tribution in class terms as well as racial terms. Often, ANC government rhetoric
creates the impression in white capitalist circles that they are seen as the undeser-
ving rich who have to fork out their wealth to the deserving (black) masses.
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Despite its redistributive policies, the ANC government has made
provision for the role of free markets in the restructuring of South Afri-
ca’s political economy. In constructing and reconstructing South Afri-
ca’s political economy, the government has chosen to let a free market
economy take its place alongside its cautiously welfarist policies.
Wealth has to be created before it can be redistributed. Private and
NGO welfare, private insurance and extended family care — leaving
part of the welfare function to private individuals and respecting their
autonomy — all augment state welfare in South Africa.20
In my view it is most likely that a welfare state will develop in
democratic South Africa in the longer term — depending on the suc-
cess of economic growth and development. The thrust of the govern-
ment’s GEAR programme is to create wealth in order to redistribute
it. As more wealth is created in the modern sector of the economy, a
further increase in urbanisation can be expected, as in other indus-
trialised states. A crucial coalition of workers and the ANC, as a so-
cial democratic movement, will find ways and means to redistribute
resources to the working classes via the typical political mechanisms
of the welfare state. The bourgeoisie — the majority of whom will be
“black” — will progressively be brought into the welfare net. As
more resources become available, welfare services will improve and a
larger proportion of the state’s budget will be allocated to funding
welfare. The “resources of power” path towards a welfare state may
conceivably be followed. The successes of the redistributive measures
practised by the ANC government so far should enhance the image
of the ruling party and help it to stay in power. The ANC has been
successful in persuading its electoral constituency that it is the only
party which can improve their economic condition.21 Thus, while
South Africa is not a welfare state, in my opinion the indications are
20 A reviewer of this article poses a question as to whether this is not quite similar
to the Western European situation. It is not. A person in a European welfare
state, whether Bismarckean, Beveridgean or Scandinavian, can draw life-
supporting social benefits without resorting to private charity. Critics of the
European welfare state complain that it has destroyed the ordinary European’s
sense of charity. For an incisive critique cf Marsland 1996: 201, 202.
21 The ANC Alliance has won two national elections as well as two local govern-
ment elections with overwhelming majorities since 1994. Cf Lodge 1999: ch 1.
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that increased economic prosperity will turn it into a more compre-
hensive welfare state.
All three theses on the development of the welfare state discussed
above support this conclusion. The “contradictions of capitalism”
thesis holds that the state uses social welfare to pacify workers in
order to ensure favourable conditions for capital accumulation. The
ANC government is doing this; indeed it is criticised by key mem-
bers of the Tripartite Alliance of cuddling up to capitalism.22 The
“nation-state” thesis argues that the welfare state is a rational aid to
the ruling elite in incorporating the working class into the capitalist
economy by way of social security measures. The analysis of section
4 and Tables 1 and 2 illustrates how the ANC government has been
doing this. The “resources of power” thesis reasons that labour-based
coalitions which hold executive power tend to devise public policies
designed to bring about greater equality among the classes. The re-
distributive policies of the ANC government have been working to-
wards such an outcome over the last seven years. This has been more
successful in racial terms than in class terms, but the (black) poor
have benefited, as argued above.
Inasmuch as the present social transfers in South Africa do not
promote social solidarity — since they take from the rich and give to
the poor, without benefiting the middle classes — progressively im-
proving social benefits over time would enhance social solidarity and
the feeling of reciprocity. Once the middle classes are brought into
the social security net, they will have a vested material interest in the
expansion of the welfare state and its consequent benefits. The point
is this: the modern capitalist economy has not solved the problem of
the vagaries of the free market and its cyclical nature. As such, the
more society is exposed to a modern industrial and service-based eco-
nomy, the more vulnerable its members become to its inevitable
business cycles. In such circumstances, politics tends to become the
politics of welfarism, where the electorate looks towards the state and
its political power to intervene on their behalf to ensure them against
economic vulnerability. The welfare state in Europe has been tena-
22 The statement of the SA Communist Party Executive after its meeting of 15
and 16 September 2001 is illustrative of this type of criticism (Beeld September
2001: 2).
134
Acta Academica 2002: 34(2)
cious and resilient, despite two decades of relentless pressure against
its benefits by what is popularly known as the neo-liberal faction.23
My contention is that in South Africa, the strong labour lobby is lay-
ing the groundwork for a welfare state by means of their partial cap-
ture of state power via the ANC. With increased economic capacity
the demand for social benefits will remain, and South Africa will
steadily progress on the road towards the typical welfare state — a
route well travelled in the industrialised world — unless economics
as a discipline finds an answer to the business cycle. Try as it might,
given the last two hundred years of capitalist progress and Marxist
socialist failure, the discipline does not seem to be finding it. The
welfare state is the consequence as political forces drive elected politi-
cians towards using state power to protect society against the failures
of the market and the vagaries of life. There is little reason to believe
that, in the circumstances described above, South Africa will prove
to be an exception.
23 For a discussion of the resilience of the welfare state in Europe, cf Scarborough
2000: 230-3.
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